Of House and Parties: What needs to change in a broken system?

Keeping a realistic outlook as House welcomes old faces, clings to old habits

Last Tuesday, 580 new congressmen and women were sworn in; igniting mixed emotions across the country. While a new beginning might have sparked hope and optimism for a few, many—including The Reformist’s tiny editorial desk—tread cautiously. History, including from not too long ago, compels us to ask: how much change can we really expect?

We refuse to accept ‘none’ as an answer, but let’s take a look at the cold facts:

First, there is a big, fat coalition in the House, reminiscent of the previous terms in which the majority of parties were in favour of the President’s agenda. As it stands, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is the only party that hasn’t announced its official position to support or oppose the new administration. Experts find this alarming: the lack of opposition and the government’s legislature majority will compromise the ‘check and balance’ function of the House.

Second, over 50 percent of the newly elected lawmakers are incumbents who, according to parliament watch Formappi, performed poorly (unproductive and brazen), which sets a bad precedent for the House’s performance this term. These old re-elected faces also give little room for younger representatives: only 15 percent of the elected House members this term are under 40, a new all-time low since the ‘98 reform.

Lastly, the presence of dynasty politics is glaring: 79 new House members are linked to incumbent representatives or public officials, signalling a trend that prioritises lineage over merit.

What we could expect (albeit reluctantly): Cycles of speedy legislative process with rushed, behind-closed-door deliberation, involving very little study and public participation that yields controversial law. Have we seen this movie before?

The controversial deliberation and passing of the IKN Law, KPK Law, and Omnibus Law (and not to mention the recent attempt to revise the Pilkada Law that sparked nation-wide protests), should remind us of how easy it is to throw proper democratic processes on the backburner while political interest and expediency take over.

(In case you need a refresher on all the controversial bills and laws from the 2019-2024 DPR, including how political parties have voted, we have summarised them for you last year.)

While the projection is bleak, this nation simply could not afford to give up and let our democracy backslide further. In this edition of The Reformist, we want to discuss the most critical organ that makes or breaks real change in order to save the House from hemorrhaging: political parties.

Did we miss our window to meaningfully reform political parties in 1998?

Are political parties the brain, the heart, or the hands that shape Indonesia’s policy? Our founding fathers have thought this through: the notes from independence preparation meetings (BPUKPI) dubbed political parties as the ‘conduit for discourse and ideas’ (wadah arus pemikiran) a.k.a. the brain. Meanwhile, our constitution (mentioned six times) and legal system (Law 2/2011) ensure their central role as the heart that shapes the nation’s democratic landscape.

Unfortunately, the image of political parties has long been tainted by its own internal challenges: factionalism, entrenched clientelism, the influence of big money, and patronage ties with officials. These issues leave their hands tied (see what we did there) and hinder their ability to fully exercise their role, leading to a political culture that often favours the elite few and established clans.

Such a mess translates to an almost universal distrust in the overall political process—including amongst their own members, sometimes. A 2024 survey by Indikator shows that both the House and Political Party are the least trusted government institutions. Again and again, the People end up being sidelined in the current political climate and power play that undermines political parties’ accountability and restricts genuine representation in the House.

According to a study, not many Indonesians believe that the House adequately represents voters' views and interests. This sentiment increases with income level: among lower- to middle-income groups, only 30-40 percent feel that the House does not represent them; however, this figure rises to over 50 percent among those earning more than IDR 4 million per month. So, it seems like citizens from lower economic classes are more likely to think that the House broadly represents them—which is interesting.

This nation-wide suspicion can be traced all the way back to the New Order and the fact that this nation was never given a real fighting chance to fix it. In one of Bijak Demokrasi’s public discussions, constitutional law expert Bivitri Susanti talked about how post-World War II Germany took their time to properly reform their political system: from democratising the process to improving the meritocracy within political parties. While relatively peaceful, reformasi in 1998 did not exactly provide us the same window. We ended up having more colours in the parliament, but with almost exactly the same undertones.

So what ought to change in political parties?

1. Financial Transparency

As long as political costs in this country remain high, financial capital continue to define the rules of the game. INDEF reported that candidates for the 2024 elections face significant costs: IDR 2-5 billion for district and city councils, IDR 7-8 billion for provincial councils, and potentially tens of billions for the House of Representatives.

Transparency International Indonesia found that while the current regulations are deemed sufficient, critical issues arise in implementation. For example, the law (2/2008 and 2/2011) states that political parties can be financed through membership fee, donation, and supplemental support from the regional/national budget. The same laws also obliged parties to maintain financial records, keep a list of donors and their contributions, ensure transparency to the public, and have the accounts audited by a public accountant annually. 

However, state financial aid (public funding) intended to help parties modernise and improve governance has been increasing in formula but failed to address the deeper need to strengthen political systems or tackle oligarchic practices. Not to mention that the mechanism for financial reporting remains incomplete. 

Furthermore, while parties must submit reports on budget realisation, balance sheets, and cash flow, audited by public accountants, the separation between state-sourced funds and non-state contributions (from party members or third parties) creates regulatory inconsistencies. So while state funds are closely monitored, non-state finances lack detailed oversight. Moreover, supervision and sanctions are limited to state funds, with accountability directed to the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), while non-state financial reports are subject to voluntary audits, lacking an enforcement body or sanctions for non-compliance. This weak regulatory framework undermines accountability in political party finances.

State funding for political parties is seen as the best option to enhance their professionalism and independence. As government subsidies decrease, political parties are more likely to seek other funding sources, worsening the situation. While state funding may seem like the easiest solution, it does not guarantee better financial management within political parties. Stronger oversight and reforms need to be coupled with every public dime given to ensure transparency and accountability in party finances. 

Moreover, this assistance doesn't necessarily have to come in the form of direct financial support, but can also include providing facilities that support party activities, such as regional office spaces for party secretariats. By reducing the political costs and financial burden on political parties, this approach can help promote a more transparent and democratic internal structure, alleviating the pressures that often lead to unethical practices.

2. Figure vs. Value Orientation

Simply put, parties need to graduate from being figure-oriented to value-oriented. We have seen this formula too many times before: a public persona—either an unhappy former member of an existing party or an established individual wanting to solidify their political influence—decided to start a political party on their own, without having a clear nor differentiating ideology.

It’s not entirely their fault: the political setup and electorate allow them to do so. Unlike countries with a majoritarian system like the United States, there are limited incentives for these leaders to care.

Once the party’s established, said individual continues to hold significant sway—sometimes almost holding complete control—over the party's direction and function. How are we supposed to have a democracy without a democratic process within political parties?

Some may be allergic to the idea of limiting the tenure of party chairpersons (PKS and PPP limit their chairpersons' tenure to two terms, or 10 years). This helps avoid the over-concentration of power in a single individual and fosters leadership regeneration. As it currently stands, the 1945 Constitution does not stipulate any restrictions on the tenure of party chairpersons, and even the Political Party Law lacks provisions regarding term limits. At what point should the tenure of political party chairpersons be left to internal party regulations, or should the government step in to ensure a democracy within parties?

3. The magic ‘P’ word

The ‘stickiness’ of party leadership can also promote an undemocratic practice, namely through Penggantian Antar Waktu (PAW), or interim replacement mechanism for parliament members, allows political parties to exert control over their representatives. Intended to ensure party discipline, it has increasingly become a tool for ousting members who conflict with party leadership. This creates a troubling dynamic where a representative’s position relies more on party loyalty than on the voters who elected them.

Political observers note that overly powerful leaders can hinder the development of new talent within parties. While these leaders may provide unity, they often create dependency, blocking the rise of equally capable successors. This lack of new leadership signals a failure in internal reform, as senior figures dominate and become synonymous with the party itself.

4. Cadre Development

Finally, weak cadre development is a disease, and its symptoms become evident with each election cycle, as celebrities and wealthy individuals secure candidacies without undergoing proper party processes. Let's take a look at the newly anointed DPR members for instance, the majority of which are old faces and many are part of established political families, celebrities who suddenly ‘care’, and even billionaires.

Meanwhile, convicted corrupt officials are also still finding their way onto the ballot. While these people’s name recognition may offer short-term electoral gains, they often bring political gimmickry, further eroding meritocracy and leadership development of the party.

While it’s true that celebrities, or anyone who meets the constitutional requirements, have the right to run for office (and we are not advocating against that), there needs to be a better caderization mechanism that promotes longevity, proper capacitation, as well as ideological cohesiveness. 

Interestingly, the state, through the Political Parties Law, does not require political parties to implement structured, regular political cadre development, even though they are public legal entities. Without consistent cadre-building activities, what’s left of a party? 

While political recruitment is mandated to be conducted by parties and is even enshrined in the amended 1945 Constitution, the state views cadre development as an internal matter for parties to handle according to their own statutes. This lack of regulation, combined with limited funding and weak commitment from party elites, contributes to the failure of many Indonesian political parties to institutionalise cadre-building as a routine activity.

Political parties need open, non-discriminatory, and tiered cadre-building processes to ensure they produce capable leaders. The open principle means that all party members should have equal access to training and development opportunities, fostering a healthy, transparent competition free from nepotism and collusion. This approach is key to nurturing high-quality leaders.

The non-discriminatory principle guarantees equal access for all members, allowing everyone a fair chance to rise through the ranks. This can also reduce internal oligarchy within parties, especially when it comes to elections and public office nominations.

A tiered system ensures cadre development follows a structured hierarchy, with clear levels—basic, intermediate, and advanced. This pyramid-like system helps parties cultivate talent systematically, aligning with both training phases and career progression within the organisation. These principles are essential to break the cycle of elite dominance and ensure that parties foster real, merit-based cadres.

A new party?

The call for political reform in Indonesia recurs every election season, but the status quo keeps thriving despite the problems we all know too well. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, political parties have held the keys to shaping the nation's leadership, especially after constitutional changes made them central to nominating presidential and other key political candidates. But after two decades of democracy, these parties still haven’t delivered. Too many politicians, chosen by these same parties, lack real moral commitment and often end up caught in corruption scandals.

While it's true that the ‘98 window for reform for our political parties has not been fully successful, we must remain steadfast in our advocacy for change. The momentum for progress should never wane; instead, we must be poised and vigilant for the next opportunity to drive meaningful reform when it arises, and it might not be a long wait. 

As discussions of a new party formation emerge, we must critically consider what needs to be different this time. 

A new party should not just be another iteration of the old guard; it must prioritise transparency, inclusivity, and genuine accountability to the people. The lessons of the past should guide us toward creating a political landscape that truly serves the interests of its citizens, rather than merely perpetuating existing power dynamics.

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Writer/Researcher:

Daffa Argada

Editor:

Nea Ningtyas

,

Afu Utami