Prabowo’s Foreign Policy: Non-aligned, independent, more active than ever?
An outlook on the shift in Indonesia’s outward direction
President Prabowo Subianto will be central to understanding Indonesia’s foreign policy moving forward, as he is expected to take on a more active role compared to his predecessor, former President Joko Widodo.
The appointment of his former personal secretary, Sugiono, as Minister of Foreign Affairs (usually reserved for career diplomats) signals that Prabowo intends to play a direct role in managing Indonesia’s international engagements.
The months leading up to his inauguration have also foreshadowed Prabowo’s intended focus on foreign policy. As Minister of Defense, he visited more than 20 countries in the last six months, making Prabowo the first Indonesian president-elect to have gone on an overseas tour before assuming office.
In his inaugural address last month, Prabowo affirmed that Indonesia will remain true to its long-standing bebas-aktif (free-and-active) foreign policy, abstaining from military alliances while striving to befriend all states.
The global order that defines Indonesia’s play
Prabowo’s foreign policy ambition will inevitably be shaped by the broader realities of international order, dominated by hegemonic power—China and the United States, in today’s world. In this hierarchical arena, hegemonic powers set the rules. Middle and smaller powers are left with limited room to maneuver.
This does not mean that we lack total agency. Only that our options to exercise agency are limited to certain spaces. Indonesia can (and has!) adopted pragmatic approaches to foreign play. But the state can only play by the rules, not rewrite them.
Take the domestically notorious hilirisasi, or downstreaming policy. Former President Jokowi pushed this policy so that Indonesia could export more profitable processed nickel, rather than raw. But instead, the EU sued Indonesia. They deemed the industry not developed enough for exporting processed commodities. That, or it was because the EU sought to maintain the current global order, where the so-called global south is forcefully relegated to the bottom of the supply chain.
Alas, Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy approach—borne from the country’s leadership in the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement—has resisted the Cold War-era’s binary and endured in the swiftly-changing global conditions since. But, independent trajectories in foreign policies are increasingly difficult with heightened tensions between the US and China. This means that Indonesia must prioritize pragmatism over principle, as evidenced by its engagement with the South China Sea and institutions like BRICS.
Regardless of President Prabowo’s own ambitions, he will inherit these constraints. Indonesia—and Prabowo—can advocate within these structures, but attempts to upend the current order risks jeopardizing the state’s national interests. Under Prabowo, Indonesian foreign policy may be reshaped to reflect new priorities, but will remain unchanged in its criteria of managing external dependencies and asserting agency within a predetermined framework of global governance.
Understanding Prabowo’s imminent pragmatism
As with all populist governments, it will be difficult to follow the next five years of Indonesian foreign policy without understanding who is at the helm of it all: President Prabowo Subianto. Often characterized as fiercely nationalist, Prabowo’s approach to foreign relations is rooted in ensuring Indonesia’s global standing and independence.
Although this section primarily covers Prabowo’s interactions with the US and China, it is important to approach this information outside of a framework that centers US-China tensions.
In the Indonesian context, foreign policy will boil down to pragmatism, in that the state will seek to avoid “choosing” a side by aiming to optimize the benefits they can gain from either hegemony to serve national interests.
With China: Collaboration vs. Compromise
Harkening back to Indonesia’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and the initiation of the Bandung Conference, Prabowo has been a long-time advocate for recognizing the agency of “developing” states and challenging the current international order.
As part of this rhetoric, the President has praised China and other Asian economies that have seen enormous economic progress in the past few decades. “There is a shift in the world, […] we don't really need Europe,” Prabowo said in November 2023, as a response to protectionist measures by the EU on critical minerals.
In the same summit, he expressed interest in “rebalancing” Indonesian governance approaches to also learn from China, India, Japan, and South Korea, in light of the West’s “double standards” in the democratic realm. During his 2019 presidential run, Prabowo stated in a presidential debate that Indonesia must imitate China’s approaches to poverty alleviation, which he considered incredibly effective.
Additionally, Prabowo has entertained (and has since succeeded) joining BRICS to increase the state’s economic standing and China was the first state he visited after declaring victory as president-elect.
As Minister of Defense during President Jokowi’s second term, Prabowo was criticized for being “too soft” when dozens of Chinese fishing vessels encroached into Indonesia’s EEZ in the Natuna Sea, a territory China claims to govern. During the situation, Prabowo described China as a “friendly nation” and promoted a “relaxed” response, despite Indonesia sending warships and fighter jets to the area.
Over the course of his tenure as Minister of Defense, Prabowo met frequently with Chinese representatives, discussing the possibility of defense cooperation between Indonesian and Chinese state-owned enterprises.
With the US: Navigating nationalism and global partnership
“All my training is American, Sir,” Prabowo stated in a call to US president-elect Donald Trump that he uploaded on X (formerly Twitter) last week. Fluent in English, German, Dutch, and French, Prabowo spent his youth in Switzerland, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, before graduating from the American School in the United Kingdom, upon which he returned to Indonesia and enrolled in the Indonesian Military Academy (akmil).
As part of the military, Prabowo was sent to train in the US in the 1980s. But in 1998, allegations of human rights abuses ended his military career, leading the US to ban him from entering the country that same year (this only changed upon his appointment as Minister of Defense in 2020).
Prabowo’s nationalist rhetoric has been a source of concern by US policymakers, who fear that he would lead the state to strengthen its strategic and economic partnership with China.
“I am not anti-West. I actually really love the West, […] but sometimes the West does not love us,” said Prabowo at an event earlier this year.
Prabowo has also expressed his dislike for political opposition, characterizing it as a Western feature of democracy. He claims that Indonesian democracy should instead be driven by collaboration. This is reflected in his cabinet, which has been expanded significantly to accommodate a wide range of political interests (read our analysis here).
Although critical of Western intervention, Prabowo recognizes the West—particularly the US—as a key partner on the global stage. His previous experience with the US has made him comfortable interacting with his US counterparts. Under Prabowo’s leadership, the Ministry of Defense notably strengthened ties with the US, including signing a “historic” Defense Cooperation Arrangement with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in November 2023.
Earlier in his term, Prabowo also approved the procurement of Boeing-made F-15 Eagle fighter jets and Sikorsky-made Black Hawk helicopters, and oversaw the continuation of Super Garuda Shield military exercises, which evolved from a US-Indonesian bilateral military exercise into a multilateral military exercise with 22 other nations.
The Outlook: Prabowo, the world, and the shift in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
In a recent article, Southeast Asia expert Ben Bland asserted that former president Jokowi “showed how Asian countries can skirt the US-Chinese rivalry” by utilizing foreign policy as a “means to achieve [...] domestic ends”. He deemed Jokowi’s foreign policy approach to be some sort of a business deal; partnering with China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Russia while “maintaining strong relations” with the US and Europe.
Although other leaders similarly refused the binary, they sought for leading roles at multilateral institutions—a stark contrast to Jokowi, who never attended a single UNGA meeting in person. In this respect, Prabowo will oversee a notable shift in Indonesian foreign policy for the coming years.
Onwards and outwards with BRICS
During the most recent BRICS summit in Russia, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugiono announced that Indonesia had officially become a new BRICS partner. This move comes following years of hesitation from the Jokowi administration, despite Indonesia being identified as a potential member supported by all five BRICS nations. In the announcement, Sugiono emphasized that Indonesia was not seeking to align the geopolitical interests of any particular bloc. Instead, joining BRICs reflected a commitment to state independence and Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy.
During the summit, Russian President Putin announced the beginning of a new world order to challenge the US-led international order. But Prabowo’s move should not necessarily be understood as part of a larger anti-West approach to foreign policy. Previously, other states with Western-aligning foreign policy have also engaged with BRICS (e.g. US-allied Thailand and NATO-member Türkiye).
During the summit, Sugiono met with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and worked with other stakeholders to support the establishment of Palestinian statehood. In this light, joining BRICS represents Prabowo’s aim to make Indonesia a more active participant in international forums and expanding opportunities for economic partnerships rather than an overt attempt to endorse or challenge the current world order.
Pragmatism in the midst of rivalry: Indonesia and US-China tensions
Prabowo has recently completed his visit to China—the first overseas trip after his inauguration—during which he met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman Zhao Leji, and the Chinese business community.
During the trip, the new President made what the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has characterized as “three big concessions” that fall under the following categories: (1) Xinjiang, (2) the South China Sea, and (3) China’s approaches to pushing a new global order.
Arguably, the most important concession is embedded within the joint statement published by both countries. Under Point 9, it is written that the two nations had “reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” which implicitly acknowledged and legitimized China’s claims over the area.
The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs later released a statement to clarify that Indonesia still did not recognize the nine-dash line, but ASPI analysts suggest that this will be unlikely to deter Beijing from weaponizing the verbiage found on the earlier joint statement.
During the visit, Prabowo also signed deals amounting to ~$10bn with Beijing, spanning numerous industries. In this sense, the visit has highlighted an intention to maintain and strengthen bilateral ties with China.
ESCAP, Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Trends 2022/2023
Economic data underscores the importance of the Indonesia-China trade relationship. In 2021, China accounted for 28.7% of Indonesia’s imports and 23.2% of its exports, making it Indonesia’s largest trading partner by a significant margin.
On the other hand, the US lags behind with 5.8% and 11.2% of imports and exports respectively. This dynamic reflects Indonesia’s heavy reliance on Chinese markets for both its imports and exports, including key commodities and manufacturing components.
With a Trump presidency on the horizon, the Indonesia–US relationship is bound to see notable changes too. Perhaps the most notable policy the president-elect has sought to enact is placing higher tariffs on goods from China.
Gita Wirjawan, the former Indonesian Minister of Trade, has argued that the “transactionality” of the Republican leadership has historically benefited Southeast Asia, and the “imposition of significant tariffs will bode well for China” as there will be a “reshoring of manufacturing capabilities” from China to Southeast Asia for global consumption.
On the other hand, this approach may be unaligned with current Indonesian downstreaming policies (hilirisasi), which seeks to transform Indonesia into a value-added economy by processing raw materials domestically rather than exporting them.
Additionally, the aforementioned dependency on trade with China would be deeply negative for Indonesian economic footing, meaning that Prabowo will need to balance opportunities from reshoring while mitigating potential disruptions to trade and supply chains linked to US-China tensions.
Although Prabowo will no doubt play a more active role on the global stage, it is unlikely that his presidency will lead Indonesia to “pick” a side between the US and China–his nationalistic rhetoric will instead aim to place Indonesia as a leader among non-aligned countries.
National dynamics and regional allies: ASEAN’s role in Prabowo’s vision
Prabowo’s outlook on broader Indonesian foreign policy has been described as a “pivot away from ASEAN,” as the president seems to “deprioritize” the region to promote itself on the international stage. In his speech at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, Prabowo promoted Indonesia as a peacemaker both in Ukraine and Gaza, but did not mention ASEAN or Asian regional security.
Others argue that Prabowo will “cling” to ASEAN in his foreign policy, understanding that ASEAN is a forum for peaceful dialogue that has been relatively successful in maintaining regional security.
It is perhaps notable that recently-inaugurated presidents in the region traditionally embark on ASEAN tours as their first overseas trip—a tradition that Prabowo has skipped by embarking on his current tour (visiting China, the US, and more) before meeting regional leaders. But Prabowo embarked on an ASEAN tour in September 2024, during which he visited five member states.
As ASEAN faces challenges such as the South China Sea dispute, Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis, and economic decoupling pressures linked to US-China tensions, Prabowo must be aware that ASEAN is a key geopolitical forum to wield on the global stage.
What does Indonesia want?
Or maybe the right question is: What will Prabowo decide for Indonesia to want? As the Prabowo administration enters this coming term, there are several areas where Prabowo will have to make pivotal decisions to navigate Indonesia’s position in the global order. This balancing act is not just a matter of external diplomacy; it will also deeply influence domestic priorities, economic resilience, and social development.
Perhaps some of the most pressing priorities to navigate will be between domestic policies and strategic foreign goals.
For example, Prabowo’s focus on food self-sufficiency through the controversial “food estate” projects, which risks straining the national budget and negatively impacting large swaths of forested areas. This conflicts directly with Indonesia’s commitment to be a net zero economy through the Long-Term Strategy for Low Carbon and Climate Resilience 2050.
Simultaneously, as global economic dynamics will shift—particularly due to the recent US elections—Prabowo will have to decide whether to align with international opportunities or prioritize domestic industrialization through hilirisasi.
Ultimately, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Prabowo will reflect the inherent tensions between domestic needs and external expectations. His nationalistic rhetoric may suggest a pivot towards self-reliance, but the connected world demands pragmatism.
Prabowo will need to align domestic development goals with global norms to maintain both credibility and relevance on the world stage. The question, then, is not just what Indonesia wants, but whether it can achieve these ambitions without compromising its longstanding approach of bebas-aktif foreign policy.
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